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Cambodian rush for a credible navy
By Dr Vijay Sakhuja -
Prompted by potential oil deposits in the Gulf of Thailand waiting to be tapped after US-based Chevron found promising oil deposits at offshore test wells in 2005, Cambodia has begun mustering its resources to establish a credible naval force to protect its interests – a move that is being watched with interest by its neighbours and allies.
[starting image – southeast asia map, with Yim Sovann & Tea Banh]
Recently, Cambodia’s Chairman of the National Assembly Commission on National Defence Yim Sovann stated that there was a strong need for a credible naval force as it was critical to safeguarding Cambodia’s maritime interests, particularly the nascent offshore oil and gas infrastructure.
Expressing similar sentiments, Cambodia’s Minister of Defense Tea Banh noted that the Royal Cambodian Navy will be augmented further to protect country’s long coastline and also to provide security to oil companies engaged in exploration in the Gulf of Thailand.
These moves come as Cambodia’s offshore areas have been discovered to be rich in hydrocarbons, with an area designated as Block A (6,278-square-kilometer) alone has a potential of about 700 million barrels of oil – resulting in a rush by international oil companies for exploration and production rights.
File image of an offshore oil rig |
Chevron, the US energy company is currently engaged in drilling and other oil companies like PTT Exploration and Production of Thailand, Medco from Indonesia and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) too are interested in exploration and production.
According to International Monetary Fund reports, oil production from the offshore platforms could begin by 2008 and the earnings for Cambodia can be estimated to be about US$174 million in 2011 and this figure would increase to $1.7 billion annually by 2021 when it would peak.
Thus, Cambodia is fast emerging as an arena for great power competition with a promise for energy and an access and basing facilities.
Strategic considerations
Accordingly, the Cambodian government has announced plans to enhance the capability of the Royal Cambodian Navy (RCN), with its staff strength being increased from 1,000 to 3,000 plus soldiers from the army have been seconded to the navy to raise another force of some 2,000 marines to protect offshore resources in the Gulf of Thailand.
Also in November 2007, nine patrol boats built by China State Ship-building Corporation (CSSC), valued at nearly US$60 million, have been added to the earlier inventory of a dozen patrol boats including six boats gifted by China in 2005.
Nevertheless, the current naval inventory is still inadequate for safeguarding Cambodia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and protecting its maritime interests.
Besides being a potential source of oil and gas for Asia Pacific economies, Cambodia is strategically located close to the international shipping lane transiting the strategic maritime gateway of Straits of Malacca through which more than 60,000 vessels pass annually.
In recent times, safety and security in the Straits has been an issue of hot discussion and debate among the littoral states (Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore) and the extra regional powers such as the US, China, Japan and India.
The littoral states have conveyed their serious concerns about extra regional initiatives for patrolling the Straits; instead have sought financial and technological assistance to enhance safety and security in this narrow passage stretching nearly 500 nautical miles.
In that context, at the recently concluded LIMA (Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition) 2007, the Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi has again reiterated that “We are strongly against any involvement of foreign assets to ensure security of the straits,” clearly sending out a signal that foreign forces are not welcome in the Straits.
In such a situation, Cambodia, bestowed with a strategic location which straddles the umbilical cord of the Asia Pacific economies, offers an excellent access and basing facility for forward deployed maritime force engaged in protecting sea-lanes and maritime trade in the Straits.
Thus it is not surprising that Cambodia has attracted the attention of China, US and India who have adopted different engagement strategies towards Cambodia to protect their maritime interests and sea-lanes.
Chinese influence
A Cambodian patrol boat |
At a functional-operational level, navies of the US, China and India seek access to Cambodia’s maritime facilities to ensure free flow of commerce and are engaged with Cambodia through a variety of initiatives that involve military assistance.
China’s strategy of engagement pivots on providing soft loans and infrastructure development programmes. Significantly these initiatives are flavoured with military sales.
As noted earlier, China gifted Cambodia with six patrol boats in 2005 and another batch of nine patrol boats built with a preferential loan were delivered in 2007, signaling friendship between the two countries.
Chinese Navy type 054A Jiangkai class missile frigate |
At the 2005 handover ceremony, the Interior Ministry Secretary of State Am Sam An said the gift was a sign of the strong friendship and cooperation between the two countries.
From a geostrategic perspective, Cambodia fits well into the Chinese sea-lane security and also supports its access and basing strategy.
The vulnerability of the Chinese maritime supply chains, particularly of energy and raw materials, has prompted China to place sea-lanes and choke points security high on agenda in its maritime strategy and also as one of the top missions for the PLA Navy.
Chinese planners and practitioners have been engaged in developing strategies to protect their maritime trade and energy transiting through the choke points of Straits of Hormuz and Straits of Malacca.
It is estimated that nearly 60% of Chinese crude is sourced from the Middle East and given the growing demands this figure is sure to rise beyond 70% in the near future and bulk of which would naturally transit through these strategic choke points.
As regards the Straits of Hormuz, China provided financial support to Pakistan for the development of Gwadar naval base. Today Gwadar can serve as a forward naval base from where the PLA Navy ships can operate in times of crisis.
As far as Straits of Malacca is concerned, President Hu Jintao has expressed his concerns about Chinese supply chain transiting through the Straits, often referred to as ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and called for exploring ways to overcome these vulnerabilities.
Reportedly, in November 2003 President Hu, without naming the countries, noted that “certain major powers” were actively strategizing to control the Straits.
File image of an oil tanker |
Towards that end China has attempted to consolidate itself on either side of the Malacca Straits by establishing a strategic staging/listening maritime reconnaissance and electronic intelligence system at the Great Coco Island in Myanmar to watch over the western approaches of the Malacca Straits.
In the east, the Cambodian naval base at Riem offers a strategic location with respect to the sea-lane transiting through the Straits of Malacca.
From an economic perspective, China has played a key role in infrastructure development in Cambodia. According to the Council for the Development of Cambodia figures, Chinese FDI in Cambodia was the highest in 2006 with US $ 763 million in approvals, twice the figures for 2005.
Chinese investments in Cambodia are more popular and are best reflected through such sentiments: “There are a number of reasons why Cambodia is receptive to China, one is the way it does business. China understands Cambodia. It doesn't throw us scraps of aid and then scold us in front of the world like a naughty child. That is not the Asian way – that is the colonial way”.
American interest
On the other hand, the US current strategy towards Cambodia appears to follow the ‘hearts and minds’ approach and is concentrating on soft measures such as medical aid to civilian populace, relief and reconstruction and low-end military training.
Critical Sea Link |
It helps the US to adopt this strategy to overcome the past animosity between the two sides when there were periods of heightened tension and hostility.
During the Vietnam War, Cambodia had played the neutral but North Vietnamese forces much to the discomfort of the US had occupied several of its border areas. The US had feared that these strongholds would be used to launch attacks against American interests in South Vietnam.
Then President Richard M Nixon ordered air strikes and in an address just before the bombing, he noted, “This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries, and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw”.
In 1975, the US and Cambodia were involved in a serious military/diplomatic incident. SS Mayaguez, a US-flagged vessel was on a routine voyage from Hong Kong-Sattahip, Thailand-Singapore and transiting through the Gulf of Siam some 60 nautical miles from the coast of Cambodia, but about 8 miles from Poulo Wai (Kao Wai), an island claimed by Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Royal Cambodian naval personnel stand at attention as the USS Gary docks in Sihanoukville |
The Khmer Rouge forces hijacked SS Mayaguez and its crew were taken hostage. The incident was graded as sea piracy and after diplomatic efforts failed, the US undertook military operations and rescued the crew.
The US decision to undertake military operations to rescue the crew of SS Mayaguez was taken in haste and according to analysts ‘credibility and prestige seemed to be the driving force throughout the planning and implementation of this crisis action’.
It was based on arguments such as “greater issues were at stake than international piracy...and the seizure of the Mayaguez raised questions of international perceptions of American power and will”.
The operation was successful to the extent that 40 crewmembers of the vessel were rescued but resulted in 18 Marines dead in the operation at Koh Tang, an island where the crew were being held hostage. As part of the operation, another 23 Marines died when their helicopter CH-53 met an accident in Thailand.
The intense bombing by the US Air force resulted in extensive damage to the airfield at Sihanoukville, naval infrastructure at Ream Naval Base and oil storage farms in the area.
Today, however, both sides appear to shed the past adversarial relationship of nearly three decades. Significantly, the relationship appears to be on an upward trajectory marked by high level visits by military personnel and ship visits.
Since 2006, successive US Pacific Fleet Commanders have visited Cambodia. In 2006, Admiral William Fallon visited the Kingdom and Admiral Timothy Keating followed next in 2007.
The USS Gary arrives in Sihanoukville, escorted by Cambodian navy vessels |
During his visit, Admiral Keating noted that Cambodia is an important regional partner in Washington's ‘war on terror’, and “We’re willing to do what we can to make their capabilities even better, and this involves information sharing, surveillance techniques and the capability to track the flow of finances around the world”.
Further, the US is “anxious to provide whatever assistance we can for Cambodian authorities to participate in exercises, to learn lessons that we have learned, and to help Cambodia develop the capability to fight terrorists and to bring them to justice”.
Perhaps what merits more attention is the frequent port calls by US Navy ships. After a hiatus of more than 30 years, in February 2007, USS Gary made the first visit to Cambodia.
Joseph A. Mussomeli, US Ambassador to Cambodia noted, “The USS Gary’s visit to Cambodia shows not only an expansion, but a deepening, of the U.S.-Cambodia bilateral relationship. While this is clearly a military ship and has a military purpose, it also has a humanitarian purpose and a diplomatic purpose”.
Again in November 2007, USS Essex made a port call at Sihanoukville and the crew engaged in community relations projects, providing medical aid, helped build/repair infrastructure in villages and engaged in professional military exchanges.
American and Cambodian doctors provide dental care to villagers |
The US believes that visits like these are not just public relations, but help maintaining friendly relations with other governments. The ship visits have also helped to rebuild military relations between the two sides that were marred by the May 1975 SS Mayaguez incident.
At another level, Cambodia and the US have also been engaged in disarmament activities. With US assistance, Cambodia dismantled and destroyed 36 SA-3 air defense missiles thus preventing these falling into illegal arms merchants.
Perhaps, the bilateral cooperation in the field of homeland security has made significant advances. With US assistance, Cambodian government installed computerized border control systems at international airports in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap and at land border crossing points at Poipet and Koh Kong.
Although the US Navy uses the naval facilities in Singapore, it would like to entrench in Cambodia to prevent China obtain a foothold.
Myriad plans
Unlike US and China, who appear to be competing for energy and influence in Cambodia, India’s military relations with Cambodia are evolving. Though geographically far, Indian naval ships have routinely called at Sihanoukville and in October 2003 carried out a low-level passage exercise with the Cambodian navy.
Besides, institutional contacts between think tanks of the two countries i.e. The United Services of India (USI) and the Cambodian Institute of Cooperation and Peace (CICP) are under consideration. Also, Cambodia offers as an alternate source of energy hungry India.
Interestingly, Prime Minister Hun Sen has visited India seven times since 1982 and the last visit was in December 2007. India has agreed to extend credit of US$35.2 million for infrastructure development.
American humanitarian aid for Combodians |
Today, Cambodia is fast integrating with the international community and is moving forward with strong foundations in political stability and social security.
The economy is on an upward trajectory with recent finds of gas and oil, and a stable environment is prevailing for national development resulting in greater confidence among the people as also with other nations and international institutions.
However, Cambodia’s capability to look after its maritime areas is inadequate. It has limited naval capability, and few financial resources for capacity building.
The 2006 Defense White Paper published by the government notes that Cambodia’s sea borders are highly vulnerable and there are several security threats including terrorism, transnational crime and illegal exploitation of maritime resources that challenge the security of the Kingdom of Cambodia.
Cambodia also has boundary disputes with its neighbours Thailand and Vietnam. The White Paper further notes that the defense budget is inadequate to meet for the modernization of the navy.
Thus it is not surprising then that Cambodia is courting the extra regional powers and drawing benefits from these engagements. For these powers, a foothold in the Straits is critical since issues of safety and security in the Straits of Malacca still loom large in their security calculations.
So far, the littoral states i.e. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have been able to keep the extra regional powers at bay and thwart their efforts to stake claim in the security architecture of the Straits but it would not be long that Cambodia may emerge as an important forward staging point for extra regional maritime forces.
Hun Sen (far right) at the recent Asean Summit |
In that context, it will useful to note that lack of resources impedes Cambodia to take part in regional or international maritime security initiatives aimed at enhancing maritime security. Although Royal Cambodian Navy has participated as observer in several Asia Pacific maritime security exercises, what it needs today is assistance to build a credible maritime force to preserve maritime order in its waters and contribute to regional security.
Cambodia being an important member of the Asean (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), this assistance must come from within the Asean countries or for that matter from the Straits of Malacca littorals.
Such initiatives by the littorals could prevent extra regional naval presence in the vicinity of the Straits of Malacca. Also, while the ASEAN members engages collectively with Asia Pacific nations to build a robust regional security environment, it will be equally important to enhance capacities of its weaker members.
Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore.
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