The future of submarine projection in France and the Barracuda class

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This article is published in Technology&Armament

- Joseph Henrotin, researcher at the Centre d’Analyse et de Prévision des Risques Internationaux (Centre for the Analysis and Forecasting of International risks)
- Alain De Neve, Defense analyst (IRSD & RMES)

It has often been deemed that once the Cold War had come to an end, nuclear attack submarines were doomed. They were too costly to build and to run, thus becoming relics of a world order where the protection of communication lines used to be a necessity. Today, the fall of the ex-USSR and globalization are said to have diluted the distribution of power, thus making them obsolete. However, it is precisely the very context of globalization, which, giving rise to low intensity conflicts as well as an increase in the mass of wealth hauled by sea, has made Naval forces all the more relevant. Meanwhile, Navies started on a doctrinal shift leading them to lean towards having at their disposal a land projection and strike capacity rather than a protection one. The renewal of fleets, particularly in France, seems to have fully acknowledged such a mutation. The two aircraft carriers, the two frigate programs, the upgrading of amphibious groups or the renewal of air and naval forces stand as so many examples of it. Yet, it is in the field of submarines, with the launch of a program for six SMAF (Sous-Marins d’attaque du Futur / Future Attack submarines), that the paradigm change could be most remarkable.

Of the necessity of submarines

It has often been pointed out that, in the same way as tanks, or crafts designed for air superiority, the submarine’s main mission was to fight its counterparts. Still, the evolution of propulsion methods, of armaments and of electronics have considerable widened the scope of its interventions. These could be classified as follows:

• Zone interdiction, i.e. the elimination or the paralysis of enemy forces, and also during blockade operations. During the operations in the Kosovo, the French submarines have blockaded the Yugoslav fleet within the harbor, thus preventing a naval escalation of the conflict. More generally, the French ships are also able to take part in the protection of strategic ships belonging to the Force Océanique Stratégique (FOST)
• Protecting and escorting naval and air and naval forces during crisis maneuver, particularly against a proliferating submarine threat, with the help of new generation ships, more silent ones – as anaerobic propulsion is getting common – making them less easily detectable;
• Participation to crisis maneuver, through dealing with targets on land. Currently, only US, British an Russian ships are able to carry out such missions;
• Intelligence and control operations of sea traffic, thanks to their stealth capacities and the modularity of the charges in the hauled captors, including through the acquisition – such as is planned in the US – of a carrying capacity for air drones;
• Special operations, by implementing the infiltration / exfiltration of special forces on a battlefield.

The scope of such missions relies on the three main features of nuclear submarines: their stealth (whether on patrol or navigation missions), their submarine durability and, lastly, their capacity for very long distance projection. Besides, new technologies make it possible to use them with other forces, which turn them into the state-of-the-art tool for increasing the maneuvering freedom of a fleet in operation. Nevertheless, they remain very expensive tools, as much in terms of technology and finance as of time.

The Barracuda was partly conceived on the basis of the SNLE-NG (Le Triomphant-class SSBN). (© DCN)

Programmatic management

That is why the launch of a program meant to replace six Rubis class nuclear submarines – implemented from 1983 to 1993, and modernized into Améthyste – was delayed several times, and France then turned to disarming its classical propulsion submarines. The six SMAF, later re-dubbed Barracuda, whose use was suggested as early as the launch of the last Rubis, were to be put to use as of 2005, still within the framework of the ESNA (Escadre des Sous-Marins Nucléaires d’Attaque / Attack Nuclear Submarines Squadron) in Toulon. Tentative talks had started between Paris and London concerning their possible collaboration in the area of some key technologies common to both the SMAF project and the Future Attack Submarine. However, the constraints arising from the 1958 agreement between the UK and the US about nuclear technology, beside the de-synchronization of the French and British schedules as to their respective projects to build submarines have put an end to such a perspective. Still, the defining phase of that class of equipment was officially launched in 1998, its inception in 2002, and the total cost of the program was estimated at b4.5 euros. Initially planned for 2010, the operational implementation will be postponed to 2012, with tests planned in 2008.

If two submarines were to be budgeted in the Loi de Programmation Militaire (Law for the Development of Military Equipment) in 2003-2008, the Defense Ministry would still expect to put one ship into service every other year. The industrial prime contracting of the Barracuda was entrusted to the Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN / Directorate for Shipbuilding for the Navy), Thales Underwater being involved in the manufacturing of combat systems, as well as Technicatome and the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique as regards propulsion. An interesting detail: the Barracuda class ships should benefit from the cost reduction resulting from the subcontracting to international manufacturers, though several observers have pointed out that some choices had not been very economical. Meanwhile, the Barracuda should integrate a great deal of technology from civilian manufacturers and benefit from the new modalities of program management, using the expertise from the development of the Scorpene. Thus, some contracting parties have been associated to the program from its very inception stage, and they have the support of the members of the Navy High Command. New manufacturing techniques should be found in the stride of that project. Modularity is to be systematically sought after, so it is estimated that whole sub-systems could be built apart from the rest, later to be integrated within the ship.

The Barracuda class: aiming for higher standards?

Conceptual drawing of the SMX-22 submarine system. (© DCN)

Technically speaking, the DCN contemplates to produce a ship whose capacity is equivalent to the US Navy Seawolf and Virginia classes, so that the Barracuda should aim for the highest standards in terms of submarine warfare. The choice will be quickly made: a platform of classical design, equipped, in the same way as the Rubis / Améthyste, with nuclear propulsion. It will be designed to use the experience acquired with the boilers in the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and the missile launching submarines of the Triomphant class, so as to minimize costs. Nonetheless, the closing down of the Pierrelate nuclear enrichment plant will make it impossible to provide the heavily enriched fuel that would have enabled ships to increase the time periods between the recharging stages of the nuclear core (from 7 to 10 years between each IPER / recharge), thus increasing sea availability. Still, the Barracuda should move 4 100 tons on the surface and 4 600 tons underwater – and able to dive to more than 350 meters deep. The ships will be able to sail at a maximum speed of 25 knots, which they should use during cruises of 70 days at most.

Most importantly, the Barracuda class should have a sound signature below that of the Rubis class one. Since they are the smallest combat nuclear submarines in the world, they had not benefited from a suspension of their propulsion devices, thus making them noisier than their US counterparts. Besides, the propeller will profit from the technological breakthroughs gained from the development of the Triomphant class. At the end of the day, the DCN is able to dub its ships as remarkably stealthy and has tried to increase their top silent speed, thus expanding their tactical mobility as well as their ability to operate from unsecured sea zones. The Barracuda ships should also benefit from a high level of automation, making it possible to reduce crews to 60, down from 75 in the case of the Rubis/Améthyste class, as a result of the intensive use of civilian based technologies. That is why D. Husson, then in charge of the program, used to say: “The explosion of the capacities of civilian computers will enable the military to replace the specific processors in the combat systems of submarines belonging to former generations by computers found “on the High Street”, thus inducing great financial savings…”

A comprehensive arms systems

On-board electronics will be more effective. The combat system on the ship will use the one developed for the fourth Triomphant, the SYCOBS (Système de Combat pour Barracuda et SNLE), as developed by Thales Underwater and derived from the SUBTICS. As it integrates and fuses the data coming from radar and sonar captors in the submarine, the system puts together the firing systems of the four types of ammunitions that are being used. In the same way as the Rubis/Améthyste, the Barracuda ships will have at their disposal a capacity to launch mines, torpedoes, but also SM-39 Exocet missiles and of SCALP-Naval cruise missiles, fired from four launching tubes, with a total of 18 weapons being taken on to a mission. The SM-39 is a sea-skimming anti-ship missile with a 50-km range whose likeliness to hit its target is as high as 90%. It is a combination of torpedoes and of those missiles that had enabled the Casabianca to virtually sink the US Eisenhower aircraft carrier and a Ticonderoga class cruiser, during the Pean exercises in 1998.

USS Virginia at sea. This class is the most recent currently in use in the US Navy. (© US Navy)

Yet, the cruise missile SCALP will be turned to naval use as of 2005, which should account for the most notable change in the French submarine capacities. Indeed, the relevance of submarines during land strike missions has been unquestionably demonstrated. It is thus estimated that, generally, a precision strike capacity, at long range, with charges specifically tailored to the targets, considerably extends the freedom of political action during a crisis. The missile, which has been in the pre-development stage since 2002, could, should it be successfully completed, become a serious challenger of the Tomahawk.

Only one loophole remains; is it a temporary one? The SMAF is not rigged with submarine drones, which is liable to place it below the future capacities of the US Navy. Though the addition of such systems is not easy at all, it is yet to be expected that operational specifications could be implemented at a later date, which could lead to the integration of submarine drones et/or air reconnaissance. The SMAF would then join the “marsupial” rationality meant to de-couple vectors and sensors.

Towards greater freedom of action during crisis maneuvers.

The operational advantage of such a combination of submarines and cruise missiles is not limited to having extra launching platforms at one’s disposal. Indeed, the submarine is then enabled to come closer to coasts, undetected by other ships. Knowing that more than 60 % of world population will live in urban areas by 2025, that most of the crises occur in those very zones or pertain to them in terms of political importance, and that besides 70 % of these zones lie by the sea-side or very near them, being able to use such precision strike capacity takes on high strategic relevance. However, such capacity depends on three main factors. The first is the safety of a ship whose cost is in the range of several hundred million euros. The technology of delayed launching capsules – enabling the SNA to throw a capsule able to launch the missile in its turn at the right moment, thus providing for its escape – makes for an affordable solution. Second condition: the modularity of the charges taken on board, which are essential to the precision of strikes, particularly in urban areas. That is one of the major challenges confronting missile manufacturers, as they will have to produce high penetration charges or smart sub-ammunitions. In the case of the US, the possibility to integrate BAT submunitions to the future evolutions of the Tomahawk would enable one missile only to strike – theoretically – 12 armored vehicles at the same time.

One last factor, around which hinges the increase in the freedom of maneuver of a cruise missile: the capacity to communicate in real time, thus allowing for effective targeting as well as the implementation of the platform. Traditionally, a submarine is “deaf, blind and mute” when in action. Having at its disposal satellite communications, besides the more traditional UHF and VHF ones, only partially improves the communications which can only be received with the periscope underwater, thus reducing the safety of the platform. Nonetheless, the Marine Nationale has implemented a Service des Systèmes d’Information de la Marine (SERSIM), which puts all the various telecommunications structures together, so as to manage them more efficiently. Meanwhile, Thales Underwear have been turning their hands to integrating SMAF to a CEC capacity (Cooperative Engagement Capability) thus networking the whole of the forces available within a given battlefield. Therefore, as things stand today, there is a great chance of seeing the completion of the technological challenge the Barracuda stands for. Practically, however, the complexity of the integration of systems, or the adaptation of work cultures to a real war in network form will stand as so many stumbling blocks in the way, that will have to be overcome. At this stage, a sound programmatic design should always give way to its concrete implementation and to its effective integration to Defense infrastructures.

Joseph Henrotin and Alain De Neve

Source & copyrights: Technology&Armament

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