From the antitank missile to the multipurpose missile - an introduction

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This article is published in Technology&Armament

- Joseph Henrotin, researcher at the Centre d’Analyse et de Prévision des Risques Internationaux (Centre for the Analysis and Forecasting of International risks)

One of the most significant trends in the history of infantry in the 20th century lies in the increase in its firing power, particularly since the coming of the propelled support systems – rockets and other missiles, mostly designed to counter tanks. Since the Panzerfaust and the Bazooka up to the short and long range antitank missiles, infantry soldiers both in Europe and the USA used to equip themselves first and foremost in relation with the threat of armored vehicles, and considered themselves as tightly connected with them. However, with the end of the cold war, the relation between infantry and tanks has been turned upon its head. Infantry still has a naturally interdependent relationship with tanks – as one protects the other within its own radius of operation – its missions have evolved considerably over the 1990’s and the 2000’s. Indeed, in view of the qualitative and quantitative proliferations of tanks worldwide, the armored vehicles threat remains a relevant one. Yet, infantry missions regained renewed importance at that same time.

That conjunction of evolutions in the strategic context has required infantry to re-appropriate its fi ring power, while it was going through great changes too, in the form of its interventions as well as in their very nature (the US Land Warrior program, the French FELIN, the German IdZ, the Indian F-INSAS). Infantry today, besides the missions that Janowitz has dubbed “constableduty”, has to cope with increasing enemy fi ring power, never encountered before. The proliferation of RPG or the end of commercial exclusive purviews are so many factors that highlight the new reality that our potential enemies are better and better armed, in a context of asymmetric all-out wars where restraint is no longer the order of the day and where, to put it in Cordesman words, “human shields today play the same part as armor-plate in traditional confl icts.” Nevertheless, antitank missiles have changed comparatively little – from the point of view of the logic of their capacity – even though a number of industrialists have given up that expression in favor of another: “multipurpose missiles”. Let us draw up the map of the weapons that are currently available.

THE THREE GENERATIONS
Three generations of antitank missiles are generally distinguished, on the basis of their guiding mode.

The first generation uses a manual wiring-guiding system (MCLOS – Manual Command to Line Of Sight), a – well-trained – operator being in charge of guiding the missile via a joystick. This is typically the case of the AT-1 (with a hit probability of 0.25) and of the Russian AT-3, of the French SS11 (with a hit probability of 0.1).
The second generation uses semi-automatic wire-guiding (SACLOS – Semi Automated Command to Line Of Sight), with the operator pointing the target onto its aiming system,until the missile hits the bull’s eye. That is true of the TOW (the fi rst versions boasting a hit probability of 0.5), of the MILAN, of the Bill 2 or of the AT-7 Saxhorn.
The third generation uses a Lock-On Before Launch (LOBL) mode, similar to the Javelin, the Nag or the NLAW: once the target has been pointed out to the system and the device has been launched,no more intervention is requested on the part of the operator.

Rockets are being updated

The current Panzerfaust-3, the RPG-7, -18, -22 or -29, the M-72 LAW, the SMAW or the AT-4 are the directly heir to the WW2 antitank and are, therefore, not guided missiles. At best, these systems can enjoy night vision systems, or even the support of laser telemetry, which make it possible to adjust the back-sights, when they do exist on launchers. These evolutions are absolutely necessary in environments characterized by ethical risks (particularly in urban environments) but also in order to be able to enjoy fully the stealth capacity afforded by night operations, at a time when one of the greatest evolutions of infantry over these last 10 years has been to operate by night. Designed as direct support weapons, these need not fundamentally be sophisticated ones. However, rocket charges have experienced great diversifi cation to adjust to the evolution of infantry missions. That is why the Russians have placed their stakes particularly on their “propelled fl ame-throwers” RPO-A Schmel, actually a rocket that has been fi tted with a thermobaric charge and was serviced in 1984.

Launching a TOW missile from an M-2 Bradley. (© US Army)

The same could apply to the Anti-Structure Munition(ASM) which is to equip the British forces, based on the Pzf 90 by Dynamit Nobel (whose charge, however, has nevertheless been devised by Rafael) and has been specifi cally designed to be used specifi cally in urban environments, since the purchase of the NLAW antitank missile has solved the issue of the antitank capacity of the British infantry. In the case of the antibunker variation of the Spanish C-90, a double charge has been opted for. The fi rst is a hollow one that “pierces” the target, and is then followed by the second one, of the HE category. There exist three other variations of the C-90 (antitank, incendiary, dual-purpose anti-tank/anti-personnel).

The same variety can also be found on the RPG-7V – the latest version of the famous rocket-thrower – equipped with the PG-7VL ammunitions (93mm, HEAT), the PG-7VR (105 mm, double charge in tandem), the OG-7VM (fragmentation) and the TBG-7V (105 mm thermobaric). These systems use either the same launchers for the whole range of ammunitions or else disposable launchers; they do not weigh more than 14 kg (the Swedish AT-12 and more generally non-disposable launchers). Used correctly, they are formidable weapons that come at a reasonable price, compared to guided missiles. In Switzerland, for example, cycling platoons equipped with Panzerfaust-3 enjoy remarkable mobility in mountain environments at average altitudes.

Even more importantly, the relatively weak explosive charge of the rocket makes it a choice tool in an urban environment, where it would be politically impossible to envisage artillery fire or aviation bombing, for fear of serious collateral damage. That is all the more so as statistics indicate that in urban combat, 90 % of targets stand 50 meters away from friendly troops, i.e. most often, a lethal distance, even though the artillery or the bombers manage to strike with the utmost degree of accuracy. Consequently, the infantry support armament market is bound to expand over the next few years. However, while doing so, it will have to take into account the technical data that limit, actually, the polyvalence of systems that are presented, quite inappropriately, as antitank and infantry support weapons.

Could the antitank missile become a support weapon?

Introducing the NLAW. (© Thales UK)

Actually, any missile enjoys its own energetic ration, combining, roughly speaking, kinetic energy (the shock) and explosive energy. However, the penetration capacity and the results of impacts on tanks or against fi xed targets (bunkers, positions, etc.) vary according to the charge and the speed that have been chosen. Hence, the devices designed to have antitank applications have a charge that is most often meant to bore through armored plates. The space inside vehicles is so small that the residual energy after piercing the plate is generally powerful enough to blow up the crew dead. However, the interior space of bunkers are generally larger (since the space might include bulwarks and other fortifi cations to protect personnel). Therefore, most often, antitank rockets and missiles make it possible to generate a psychological shock able to destabilize the crew inside, but not greatly distress it (except of course in case the position collapses). This is all the more so as antitank missiles have been designed to explode on hitting the target. As for infantry support, the energy will be absorbed by the wall, although, ideally, the kinetic energy should destroy the wall, before the missile explodes inside the building itself.

However, this is a dilemma that does not prevent the emergence of new types of devices specifi cally designed to be polyvalent. One step above rockets, systems like the Saab NLAW (Next-generation Antitank Weapon), the Lockheed Martin Predator/SRAW (Short-Range Antitank Weapon, the FGM-172A in its antitank version, the FGM-172B for urban combat), the Rafael Spike SR (scrapped to enable the company to focus on the Matador) or the Eryx by MBDA, which can be fi red from warships and have clearly been developed for applications in urban combat, where the enemy might be entrenched or be using vehicles. In the case of the NLAW, the operator selects direct modes of attack (infantry support) or the OTA (Overfl y Top Attack – which attacks tanks through their roof-top).

In the latter case, the relative weakness of the charge (self-forged) – necessary since the device must remain very light (12 kg maximum) – is offset by an attack profi le on the generally least well protected part of vehicles. With a 600-meter range, the missile is also fast enough (from 0 to 400 m in 2 seconds) to let the operator enough time to jump into hiding for fear of enemy counter fi re.

Medium, long and very long range antitank missiles

That category of light antitank missiles is often considered as able to supplement heavier devices, with maximum ranges in the order of 2,500m, whose most typical examples are the MILAN by MBDA, the Javelin by Lockheed Martin, the Spike-MR by Raphael or the Bill 2.by Saab. Generally designed for antitank missions, they are quite useful against enemy positions in urban areas. So, the Javelin has been used in urban operations in Iraq. Since it is not equipped with a wire-guiding system, and can be fi red from the shoulder and not necessarily from a mount, it offers great mobility. As it uses an IR imager and two attack modes (direct and OTA), the missile is a very effi cient one (double HEAT charge in tandem) but a lot more expensive. As for the Bill 2, the use of an optical captor and of another magnetic one; coupled to algorithms making it possible to determine the position of the turret, makes it possible to enjoy several engagement modes. Thus, the optical captor is activated in case of a soft target attack, contrary to the magnetic captor. The rocket can be adjusted, so the missile can bore through a wall before exploding. Meantime, while all captors have been cut and the rocket activated for explosion on impact; it can follow an LOS (Line Of Sight) trajectory and be launched against enemy positions.

In the higher category, are to be found missiles such as the TOW, the HOT, the South African Ingwe, the Spike LR or the Chinese HJ-8 (or its Pakistani version, the Baktar Shikan). Their range is in the order of 4 000 m, they are heavier (thus requiring them to be rigged to vehicles), they are generally wire-guided and enjoy a more powerful charge. With a production of more than 650 000 missiles, and serviced in more than 45 countries, the TOW is undeniably the most prolifi c of all, and evolves as a complex family whose last two versions (the TOW 2A and 2B, each of them equipped with 2RF radio guided antitank and anti-bunker modes) have kept the basic features of the fi rst versions: optical follow-up of the target (possibly coupled to a thermal imager) and wire-guiding devices (except for the 2RF). A fire and forget version using an IR image was scrapped. Lastly, it is worth mentioning the very long range antitank missiles, such as the AGM-114 Hellfi re, the Chinese HJ-9, the PARS-3/Trigat LR or the Spike ER, which attack-helicopters are usually rigged with. Though the latter have been designed for antitank applications (in tandem HEAT charges, on-impact detonation), they will certainly evolve remarkably, with the installation of thermobaric charges on the AGM-114K, for example.

Is there such a thing as a multipurpose missile?

As will soon be obvious, the concept of polyvalence, once applied on land tactical missiles is an ambiguous one. Following the too short analysis we have just conducted, one might say that, beyond the distinction between “antitank devices” (including Dragon, MILAN, HOT, most Russian and Chinese missiles, Ingwe, etc.) and « polyvalent devices » (such as Bill 2, the second generation TOW, the Javelin, etc.), two trends are emerging. Either the missile knows one programming of its rocket and of the attack mode before fi ring (Bill 2); or, more often, the missile or the rocket has known a family development (TOW, Javelin, NLAW, Hellfi re) enabling fi ghters to choose the weapon best suited to the situation they are up against. In return, such a family development requires heavier logistics in order for armed forces to have a really multipurpose strike capacity. Thus, the TOW 2A in its Bunker buster version would constitute the Stryker missile armament equipped with launchers – while it is likely that the latter might, one of these days, have to cope with armored vehicles (which does not, however, exclude the use of the antitank version – that is the advantage of families).

Launching a Predator/SRAW. (© Lockheed Martin)

Nevertheless, the polyvalence of the device is also being questioned for its guiding modes. Wireguiding, though it makes the weapon immune to jamming, raises a number of issues: it is out of the question to carry out deported support shootings in MOUT with some Javelins, as was done in Iraq. In the same way, the Indian Nag, with a scope ranging up to 6,000 km is Lock-On Before Launch. Once it has been launched, it is self-guided, using an IR imager or a millimetric self-guider. Though this is not a prohibitive liability for the time being, one can hardly imagine how that system could survive, in view of the constant enlargement of the surface areas “held” by infantry units. In practice, however, engagements using short-range missiles, naturally used in LOS mode and over a very short period of time, are less problematic. Another issue is the speed of missiles, faced to the proliferation of the Active Protection Systems (APS) such as the Arena, the Drozd II, or then again the Troph, but also in view of the reinforcement of armored plating.

With the cancellation of the LOSAT (Line of Sight Anti Tank), designed to replace the TOW, the USA have obviously given up the paradigm of a missile specializing in antitank missions but enjoying a very high initial speed, an asset not all current missiles can boast about. Yet, the reaction time of APS systems (0.07 seconds, in the case of the Arena) faced to a threat greatly determines its effi ciency. This is all the more so as it is inconceivable that APs should be used in future in “kit” mode, in order to protect tactically important positions (advanced headquarters, and logistical positions). That is a way that is being explored by the Israeli since the attacks by the Hezbollah with obsolete missiles (rightly deserving the name of “polyvalent” in that case) on their positions.

To conclude on that issue, the multipurpose antitank missile is still out of the reach of industrialists, except for a few systems, whose polyvalence has to be paid for,often at a high price, in terms of delays, for instance. Often designed for contexts presenting specifi c threats, the current antitank missiles are clearly heir to the Cold War. Nonetheless, interesting lessons can be learnt from studying them, especially regarding the processes of Transformation. First,human intervention should not be excluded from the chain of processes – or else, there is a risk of aiming at decoys or causing collateral damage. Secondly, absolute polyvalence (and its conceptual corollary, the full spectrum) often pertains more to intellectual conceptualization than to reality, as one aspect of the mission is generally stressed over all others. Thirdly, one should keep in mind that Fuller’s dialectics between the sword and the armor remains a relevant concept, as there is no such thing as a silver bullet…

Joseph Henrotin

Source & copyrights: Technology&Armament

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